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ENHANCING ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION: A REGIONAL
ARBITRATION CENTRE FOR ASEAN?
PEARLIE M. C. KoH*
ECONOMIC co-operation within ASEAN' can be said to have seriously
begun only at the beginning of the nineties. Prior to that, it was well
known that, ASEAN as a co-operative grouping, had existed mainly with
a political and strategic focus. It is with this focus that ASEAN managed
to establish and maintain cohesiveness through the years despite the
shaky beginnings of what has been described as a "brittle alliance" borne
of a common fear of communism. 2 And it is with this focus that ASEAN,
as a regional grouping, has generally been hailed as a success.
In contrast, the progress of economic co-operation within ASEAN has
been described as slow and reluctant.3 Whilst economic co-operation has
always been part of the avowed reason for the regional grouping,4
ASEAN's achievements in this area have, up until recent years, been
insignificant. In the past, several ASEAN countries were following
inward-looking and nationalistic policies.' National priorities and
national sovereignty took precedence ahead of regional priorities,6 unless
the latter coincided with the former. This was largely due to differences in
the levels of economic development and industrialisation among ASEAN
countries. However, from around about the 1980s, ASEAN began
adopting economic and financial liberalisation policies due to external
pressures. Mr Lim Boon Heng the then Senior Minister of State, Ministry
of Trade and Industry, Singapore,7 attributed the impetus for this trend of
* Assistant Professor, Nanyang Business School, Singapore.
1. The Association of Southeast Asia Nations with Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines,
Singapore and Thailand being the founding members. Brunei Darussalam joined the
Association on 7 Jan. 1984, Vietnam on 29 Jul. 1995 and Laos and Myanmar on 23 Jul. 1997.
Cambodia, the last link in the ASEAN-10 vision, was scheduled to joint ASEAN in Jul. 1997
but its admission was delayed following the eruption of internal strife just two weeks before
the original stated date of admission. At the sixth ASEAN Summit, held on 16 Dec. 1998,
the decision was taken to admit Cambodia to ASEAN.
2. R. Tasker, A. Schwarz & M. Vatkiotis, "Growing Pains", Far Eastern Economic
Review, 28 Jul. 1994, p.2 2 .
3. P. Imada & S. Naya (Eds), Afta: The Way Ahead (1992), p.
1 2 .
4. The ASEAN Declaration, Bangkok, 8 Aug. 1967, in ASEAN Documents Series
(1967-1988) 3rd edn, ASEAN Secretariat, Jakarta.
5. S. Naya & P. Imada, "The Long and Winding Road Ahead for AFrA", in P. Imada &
S. Naya (Eds), Afta: The Way Ahead (1992), p.55.
6. N. Akrasanee, "Issues in ASEAN Economic Regionalism", in K. D. Jackson & M. H.
Soesastro (Eds), ASEAN Security and Economic Development (1984), p.
8 0 .
7. Lim Boon Heng, keynote address at the International Symposium on Regional
Economic Co-operation and ASEAN Growth Triangles, Singapore (23 Apr. 1992).
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liberalisation to two main factors. These were Japan's economic success
from the 1950s and the later economic success stories of the four Asian
"tigers", Korea, Hong Kong, Taiwan and Singapore, and the pressure of
severe commodity price declines in the early to mid 1980s.
As ASEAN adopted outward-oriented trade, investment and industri-
alisation strategies, disparities in tariff structures were reduced, industries
globalised and the diverse levels of industrialisation within ASEAN
began to converge. 8 Foreign investment flowed into and within the region
and through these investments, the ASEAN economies began to
integrate. This led to an increase in intra-ASEAN intra-industry trade9
that highlighted the complementary factor endowments of the different
ASEAN countries and led ultimately to the dawning realisation that
trade in ASEAN was more complementary than competitive.'°
It is significant that rapid and consistent economic growth in ASEAN
followed the countries' liberalisation policies. With the resulting econ-
omic boom came the new-found confidence that the countries of ASEAN
could meet the challenges that inevitably followed the adoption of such
outward-oriented development policies."
As ASEAN entered the decade of the 1990s, there was a perceptible
change in focus that came with the realisation that improving and
strengthening intra-ASEAN economic co-operation is necessary to
maintain ASEAN's relevance in a changing world. Perhaps by far the
most comprehensive, and perhaps the most significant ASEAN economic
co-operation measure to date remains the implementation of the
ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA). This tremendous step forward 2 was
taken by the Heads of State of ASEAN at the Fourth ASEAN Summit in
January 1992, where the ASEAN Heads of Government signed the
Framework Agreement on Enhancing ASEAN Economic Cooperation
(the "Framework Agreement") and the Agreement for a Common
Effective Preferential Tariff Scheme (CEPT) for the ASEAN Free Trade
Area. It may be considered a concrete testament to ASEAN's commit-
ment to greater economic co-operation and integration. AFTA rep-
resents the recognition by ASEAN leaders that the "best way forward"
for ASEAN in the 1990s is through freer competition and further
economic liberalisation. These ideals are to be achieved through
8. H. Soesastro, The ASEAN Free Trade Area & The Future of Asian Dynamism (1991),
p.7 .
9. Ibid.
10. S. Naya & P. Imada, "The Long.and Winding Road Ahead for AFTA", in P. Imada &.
S. Naya (Eds), Afta: The Way Ahead, (1992) p.5 6 .
11. T. S. Lee, "The ASEAN Free Trade Area: The Search for a Common Prosperity",
(1994) 8 Asian-Pacific Economic Literature 1, at p.2.
12. S. Naya & P. Imada, "The Long and Winding Road Ahead for AFTA", in P. Imada &
S. Naya (Eds), Afta: The Way Ahead (1992), p.5 3.
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reductions in tariff and non-tariff measures which, according to Singapore
Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong would "commit ASEAN to open its
markets sector by sector... This will attract more investments to ASEAN,
and help ASEAN ... maintain its position relative to the [Single
European Market] in Europe and [the North American Free Trade
Area]".' 3 The then Thai Prime Minister Anand Panyarachun also
observed that "AFTA would lead to a larger ASEAN market of 360
million people which would surely be more attractive for investment,
both from within and without, than six separate markets".' 4 The ultimate
goal, as expressed by Malaysia's Foreign Minister Datuk Abdullah
Ahmad Badawi, is a borderless ASEAN. 5
The recent financial crises in Asia hit the ASEAN countries hard and
provided perhaps the first true test for the Association's cohesiveness.
Bilateral relations between some members are not at their best. In the
words of Singapore's Foreign Minister, Professor S. Jayakumar, ASEAN
is going through a very testing period as the financial crisis strained
bilateral relations.' 6 This notwithstanding, ASEAN members continue to
co-operate on ASEAN matters. At the sixth ASEAN Summit held in
Hanoi, Vietnam, 7 the heads of government adopted the "Hanoi Plan of
Action".'8 This is a medium-term formulation of initiatives aimed at the
achievement of ASEAN's development goals for the year 2020, but with
the immediate objective of addressing the Asian financial and economic
crisis in order to prevent its recurrence. It has been decided that AFTA
and various other liberalisation measures to promote commerce and
remove barriers to trade should be implemented as quickly as possible.
The ASEAN answer to the crisis, therefore, is to step up economic
integration of the ASEAN members into a single market and investment
area.
It is clear that ASEAN is now searching for a common prosperity.' 9
Even in the midst of a near-crippling financial crisis, regional economic
co-operation is recognised as being vital to increase the attractiveness of
the region as a whole, and hence the individual countries, to investors.
Unlike the empty economic co-operative declarations of the past, the
recent initiatives look poised for success. However, the emphasis has thus
13. Goh Chok Tong, Closing Statement at the fourth ASEAN Summit, Singapore (27
Jan. 1992).
14. Anand Panyarachun, Opening Statement at the fourth ASEAN Summit, Singapore
(27 Jan. 1992).
15. "ASEAN Soon to Become a Borderless Entity, Says Badawi", The Singapore Straits
Times, 20 Aug. 1996, p.2 .
16. "ASEAN 'Strong Despite Economic Crisis' ", The Singapore Straits Times, 16 Mar.
1999, p. 3 9 .
17. Held on 15 Dec. 1998.
18. The Hanoi Declaration, 16 Dec. 1998.
19. Ibid., at 7.
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far been on trade and tariffs, little attention having been focused on legal
issues and the necessary legal responses.
Legal relationships flow necessarily from any economic co-operative
venture. As economic correlation continues to expand and become more
complex, these legal relationships also become correspondingly more
complex. 20 If the settlement of disputes and the enforcement of claims
arising from economic transactions are uncertain and time-consuming, it
can only hamper ASEAN economic co-operation and the smooth
development of the ASEAN market. The creation and development of
an appropriate legal order must necessarily accompany the creation and
generation of a regional economic system within ASEAN on the regional
level.
I. THE ASEAN PREFERRED METHOD OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION
THE 1976 ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Co-operation is said to contain
the "seed that might well spring forth as the legal framework for regional
dispute settlement 2 1 in ASEAN. Chapter IV of the Treaty contains five
articles for the "pacific settlement of disputes" through the establishment
of a "High Council" comprising a representative at ministerial level from
each member state. The first line of action in the event of dispute however
remains direct negotiation between the disputing parties. Only in the
event that no solution is reached through'this method is the High Council
"to take cognisance of the dispute". The basic approach towards dispute
settlement adopted is reflected in Article 13, which provides as follows:
The high contracting parties (i.e. the member states) shall have the
determination and good faith to prevent disputes from arising. In case
disputes and matters directly affecting them should arise, especially
disputes likely to disturb regional peace and harmony, they shall refrain
from the threat of use of force and shall at all times settle such disputes
among themselves through friendly negotiations.
The dispute settlement provisions of the 1976 Treaty provided the
common track on which all other provisions concerning the resolution of
disputes, found in the subsequent various agreements on economic
co-operation in ASEAN, are to run. Non-adversarial and informal modes
for dispute settlement and conflict management are preferred. Hence,
consultation and negotiation, rather than recourse to a judicial or
quasi-judicial mechanism, are advocated. Prior to the conclusion of the
20. L. S. Bartlett, "Full Faith and Credit Comes to the Common Market: An Analysis of
the Provisions of the Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and
Commercial Matters" (1975) 24 I.C.L.Q. 44.
21. P. V. Quisumbing. "Problems and Prospects of ASEAN Law: Towards a Legal
Framework for Regional Dispute Settlement", in R. P. Anand & P. V. Quisumbing (Eds),
ASEAN Identity, Development and Culture (1981), 308.
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Protocol on Dispute Settlement Mechanism,22 these consultative pro-
cedures worked well at the intergovernmental level.
The ASEAN stand on dispute resolution and settlement reflects an
innately South-east Asian values that can be said to be common to all the
ASEAN member states: the preference of Asian societies for informality
in the resolution of conflicts and hence their reluctance to resort to the
devices of lawyers and courts for the settlement of disputes. This is to be
contrasted with a perceived preference in certain Western societies for
resorting to lawyers and the courts and for adherence to well-defined and
established "rules of the game". Any resolution of conflict would then be
in accordance with these rules. This preference can perhaps be attributed
to the cultural values of the "Western society, which is peculiarly
assertive, confrontational and adversarial".23 This is said to contrast
"rather sharply with the courteous and consensual approach to decision-
making that is characteristic of some parts of Asia. 2 1 In South-east Asia,
decision-making is through consensus whilst mediation and conciliation
on an informal basis, have been the traditionally preferred method of
dispute resolution.' That this holds true in ASEAN is reflected in how
ASEAN has been conducting its affairs since its inception. The political
leadership of ASEAN has found the utility of unstructured and informal
communication as a means of overcoming sensitive issues. As Singapore's
present Senior Minister, then Prime Minister, said at the opening of the
15th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, "we have made progress in an Asian
manner, not through rules and regulations, but through musyawarah
(Indonesian for consultation) and consensus."
However, as the membership in ASEAN expands, the need for change
becomes increasingly patent. Concluding the Protocol, thus, is a recog-
nition of the fact that it would be erroneous to think that consultative
procedures will always remain effective as dispute settlement devices,
particularly since there is a tendency to shelve contentious issues in
ASEAN consultations 26 in order to avoid confrontations. Even if matters
of conflict were raised, there is the ever-present fear of stalemate in the
process that may result in diplomatic failure. This effectively means that
the economic co-operation initiatives would risk being nipped in the bud
in the event that disputes arose. As Dr Dewi Fortuna Anwar of the
Jakarta-based Centre for Political and Regional Studies observed at a
22. On 20 Nov. 1996.
23. Address by Australian Chief Justice Anthony Mason at a graduation ceremony at
Griffith University, Queensland on 6 Apr. 1995.
24. Ibid.
25. See generally M. B. Hooker, A Concise Legal History of South-East Asia (1978).
26. P. Thambipillai, "ASEAN Negotiating Styles: Asset or Hindrance", in ASEAN
Negotiations-Two Insights (1985).
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conference organised by the Institute of South-east Asian Studies,
Singapore:
The time-honoured ASEAN way of sweeping problems under the carpet
and hoping that time will clear them away, is probably going to become
increasingly untenable in the future, given the growing diversity in
membership and the emergence of new generations of leaders whose
approach will be more straightforward and business-like and, therefore,
less patient with ASEAN's indirect approaches.27
Then there is the danger that the outcomes of such consultative
proceedings will be dictated by the relative political power of the ASEAN
members.2' That this danger is not to be underestimated in ASEAN is
illustrated by the threatening stance taken by Jakarta towards the
Philippines in May 1994 over a Manila conference on East Timor. The
observation was made that as Indonesia sees itself as playing an
increasingly important role on the global stage, it may feel less and less
constrained by what the rest of ASEAN feels. 9
Where there are structured settlement mechanisms, if negotiations
should reach an impasse, these mechanisms can be resorted to. Other-
wise, "the parties are left basically to rely upon their respective power
positions, tempered (it is hoped) by the good will and good faith of the
more powerful party". 3' The existence of a credible adjudication pro-
cedure will not only settle any genuine issue but may actually improve on
the effectiveness of the consultation procedure without resort to the
formal settlement mechanism. This is borne of the concern of govern-
ments that the failure of any consultative conciliatory proceedings will
expose them to embarrassing adjudicatory procedures. The prospect of
resorting to third-party adjudication may therefore induce both sides to
avoid actions that may involve negative outcomes, and hence a resultant
loss of face. Accordingly, the parties may actually renew efforts towards
co-operation and ultimately an amicable settlement of differences. 31 The
preventive effects of a formal dispute settlement mechanism should
therefore not be underestimated, particularly in intergovernmental
matters.
27. Paul Jacob, "Many see ASEAN's Expansion as a Positive Development", The
Singapore Straits Times, 21 Nov. 1997, at p.44.
28. R. E. Hudec, Adjudication of International Trade Disputes (1978) at p.2 9 ; J. H.
Jackson, "Governmental Disputes in International Trade Relations: A Proposal in the
Context of GATT", (1979) 13 Journal of World Trade Law 1, at pp.3-4.
29. R. Tasker, Schwarz & M. Vatikiotis, "Growing Pains" (28 Jul. 1994), Far Eastern
Economic Review, p.23.
30. J. H. Jackson, "Governmental Disputes in International Trade Relations: A Proposal
in the Context of GATT" 13 Journal of World Trade Law 1, at p.4.
31. R. E. Hudec, Adjudication of International Trade Disputes (1978), p. 2 8 .
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Undoubtedly of immense significance therefore, the Protocol lays
down a mechanism to settle disputes, patterned after the World Trade
Organisation dispute settlement understanding, in all areas of ASEAN
economic co-operation including AFTA and covers existing and future
economic agreements. Although the Protocol is an important move for
ASEAN, still more needs to be done in the area of dispute settlement and
this is mainly because the provisions of the Protocol relate almost
exclusively to disputes on an intergovernmental basis. There are potenti-
ally three levels at which disputes may occur in ASEAN. As already
alluded to, intergovernmental disputes may occur over national trade
policy measures that jeopardise the spirit or the terms of a treaty or
breaches of any of the ASEAN agreements. In addition, disputes can
occur at the private level, as between investors and business people over
business relationships borne of the economic co-operative ventures
started by the governments, and also at an intermediate level between
host states and investors that may arise out of their usually highly
sophisticated contractual relationships. The concern at this last level is
that the host State could potentially unilaterally modify or remove the
contractual rights of the investor by amending national laws.32
In most instances, the negotiators of ASEAN economic programmes
have been concerned with disputes at the intergovernmental level and
have deemed that diplomatic decision-making would be sufficient or the
only appropriate channel for the handling of any intergovernmental
disputes. ASEAN documents on economic co-operation therefore tend
to limit dispute settlement to intergovernmental measures and remedies.
The view seems to be that the disputes of private parties, if and when
these arise, can be adequately handled by the existing national legal
regimes. This position vis-d-vis dispute resolution in ASEAN has led to
the comment that the term "dispute resolution" hides the ASEAN choice
for political or bureaucratic review instead of judicial review.33 As the
commentator points out, bureaucratic review of disputes has as draw-
backs, the politicisation of issues as businesses have to file complaints with
the governments, unequal treatment of identical cases and softening of
the law because of a lack of case-law effects.34 Indeed, diplomatic
decision-making is unlikely to afford much relief to private parties35
whose interests cannot be adequately represented at that level. The
32. A. Giardina, "The International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes
Between States and Nationals of Other States", in P. Saracevic (Ed.), Essays on
International Commercial Arbitration (1989), p.
2 14 .
33. J. Pelkmans, "Institutional Requirements of ASEAN with Special Reference to
AFTA", in P. Imada &. S. Naya (Eds), After: The Way Ahead (1992), p.
12 9 .
34. Ibid.
35. R. H. Folsom, "ASEAN as A Regional Economic Group-A Comparative Lawyer's
Perspective" (1983) 25 Malayan Law Review 211, at p.217.
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private sector and increasing foreign interests in ASEAN would expect
some structure to dispute resolution vis-d-vis ASEAN matters36 and
because ASEAN economic growth is reliant for a significant part on
private ventures, this aspect of the problem must not be ignored.
II. TOWARDS A REGIONAL ARBITRATION CENTRE
IT was observed more than a decade ago that a full legal superstructure
like that of the European Union in ASEAN was unnecessary and may
actually be more of a liability given ASEAN's preference for pragmatic,
step-by-step, consensual progress.37 Indeed, even today, in spite of all the
enthusiasm for and pledges towards increased economic co-operation
within the region, and the generally perceived optimism that economic
co-operation within ASEAN is taking off, one must not assume that the
level of relationships within ASEAN has reached the stage where there
may be unquestioned acceptance by member states of supra-national-
ism.3" There is no doubt that political relationships within ASEAN have
in all these past years, attained a certain degree of stability despite
divisions in historical, cultural and doctrinal attitudes. However, it
remains clear that the preferred process for settlement of outstanding
issues remains one that is based on good faith and consensus, and the
aversion to submitting to perceivably inflexible rules and regulations is
almost as strong as before. The ASEAN governments are unlikely to be
prepared to create a regional legal system which could potentially
facilitate private and public challenges to national economic policies.39
Nevertheless, it is suggested that, as the pool of ASEAN economic
programmes continues to grow in size and significance, further progress in
economic co-operation dictates that something more structured than the
Protocol for the resolution of disputes, at all private and public levels, on
regional matters, be initiated, if not put in place very soon. If the aim of
the economic co-operative measures are achieved and ASEAN continues
to see increased intra-ASEAN and foreign trade and investment, the
generation of private trade and investment disputes would be inevitable.
Particular problems can arise at the government-private level. Business
contracts between States and state enterprises on the one hand, and
36. By "ASEAN matters", I am referring to disputes that arise out of investment
ventures in ASEAN entered into as a direct result of governmental initiatives to enhance
economic co-operation in ASEAN, whether these arise as between ASEAN nationals or
between an ASEAN national and a foreign partner.
37. R. H. Folsom, "ASEAN as A Regional Economic Group-A Comparative Lawyer's
Perspective" (1983) 25 Malayan Law Review 211, at p.2 1 8 .
38. J. L. Calamita, "The 'World Court': Coping With Political Realism" (1985) 17 Ottawa
Law Review 553 at p.565; see P. Pescatore, The Law of Integration (1974), pp.4 9 - 5 5 for a
definition of "supra-nationality".
39. R. H. Folsom, "ASEAN as A Regional Economic Group-A Comparative Lawyer's
Perspective", (1983) 25 Malayan Law Review 211, at p.216.
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private enterprises on the other (usually large foreign multinational
corporations) are entered into on the part of States, particularly
developing States, for the acquisition of know-how, experience, mana-
gerial and technical capabilities as well as foreign capital.4" The problems
encountered by the private party in any dispute involving States stem
usually from the fact that both commercial and political interests are
involved." As one commentator put it, the political and commercial
interests in such international contracts involving the State as a party
"seen to be guided by General de Gaulle's dictum: 'I am for the law as
long as it is not contrary to our interests.' 42 The problems of enforcement
of a judgment or award against a State may also be thwarted by the
traditional notions of "State immunity" and "act of State". Very
generally, by the doctrine of State or sovereign immunity, national courts
will refuse to be seized of a claim against a foreign State when the claim is
associated with acts of that State as a sovereign as distinguished from
purely commercial acts.
In ASEAN, the member states therefore have to be aware that in order
to attract the foreign investment needed to ensure development of their
economies, multinational private enterprises should be given certain
guarantees that their rights under contracts would be protected.43 A
formal dispute settlement mechanism in ASEAN would go some way in
providing the desired contractual equilibrium.
At the moment, however, in the event of such disputes arising, parties
are left to resort either to adjudication by national courts or arbitration at
an agreed arbitration institution. Foreign parties in particular, may be
wary of submitting disputes to national courts in ASEAN, either because
of the perception that the applicable law is uncertain or because of a fear
of bias. There does not seem to be a central authority on the interpret-
ation of ASEAN agreements at present, although this function may now
be undertaken in part by the newly restructured ASEAN secretariat
whose new expanded role includes the provision of advice on ASEAN
activities.44 Even so, the role of the secretariat remains bureaucratic and
40. L. J. Bouchez, "The Prospects for International Arbitration: Disputes Between States
and Private Enterprises", in A. H. A. Soons (Ed.), International Arbitration: Past and
Prospects (1990) p.1 0 9 .
41. See "International Arbitration Involving States and State-Entity Parties" in J. D. M.
Lew (Ed.), Contemporary Problems in International Arbitration (1987) for a consideration
of these problems.
42. A. H. Herman, "Disputes Between States and Foreign Companies", in J. D. M. Lew
(Ed.), Contemporary Problems in International Arbitration (1987), p.
2 5 0 .
43. Some of the ASEAN countries have entered into bilateral investment protection
agreements with other countries. Some of these agreements contain arbitration clauses
providing for arbitration of certain investment disputes between the ASEAN country and
nationals of the treaty countries to be referred to arbitration under the auspices of the
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes in Washington.
44. Annual Report of the ASEAN Standing Committee, 1992-1993.
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because of the lack of a case-law effect, certainty and consistency in
interpretation cannot be assured.
Businessmen and governments alike are increasingly resorting to
arbitration in international dispute settlement. This is largely due to
perceived neutrality of a tribunal that is not part of the government
structure of any particular State, as well as the perceived efficiency and
relative inexpensiveness of international arbitration when compared with
litigation in national courts. 45 The latter perception may in fact be
erroneous in that while part of the costs of litigation may be borne by the
State, all the costs of arbitration, including the costs of the arbitration
centre, the arbitrators' fees and the fees of the advocates, are borne by the
disputing parties. Nevertheless, disputants are attracted to the relative
informality of the arbitration process and to the fact that they are able to
customise the system of arbitration to the needs of the particular case by
contractual agreement. One of the principal advantages of arbitration
over litigation would be the opportunity afforded to disputants to select
arbitrators of special skill and experience over the subject-matter of the
dispute.
It is therefore the proposal of this paper that a regional arbitration
centre may be the answer in ASEAN's context. An ASEAN arbitration
centre will provide ASEAN States and institutions, ASEAN-based
enterprises and ASEAN nationals an arbitration forum to which disputes
arising directly out of ASEAN economic relations could be taken. A
regional arbitration body as a dispute resolution mechanism for ASEAN
governments would also prove to be more palatable to ASEAN leaders
than a full-fledged supra-national court, as they are then not forced to
swallow the "bitter pill of compulsory jurisdiction ,46 resort to arbitration
being based on consent. In relation to the CEPT Scheme, some
businessmen have already proposed that an arbitration body be set up to
deal with any differences that may arise pursuant to the Scheme. 47 There
seems no reason why an arbitration centre on a regional scale should not
be set up to handle all disputes (whether intergovernmental, between a
government or state enterprise and a private party, or between private
parties) arising under any of ASEAN's economic co-operative schemes.
It should be pointed out that resort to the proposed regional arbitration
45. H. Smit, "The Future of International Commercial Arbitration: A Single Transna-
tional Institution?" (1986) 25 Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 9, at pp.10-12.
46. J. L. Calamita, "The 'World Court': Coping with Political Realism" (1985) 17 Ottawa
Law Review 553, at p.565.
47. S. Tiwani, "Legal Implications of the ASEAN Free Trade Area" [19941 Singapore
Journal of Legal Studies 218 at p.233.
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centre by any of the ASEAN States is not precluded by the terms of the
Protocol.
4 8
That there are already existing international arbitration tribunals in
ASEAN (in Kuala Lumpur 9 and in Singapore °) and elsewhere5 may
prompt the question whether a separate ASEAN system of arbitration
would be necessary-would the systems established by these arbitration
centres not be sufficient? In answering this question, one must constantly
bear in mind the issue at hand-i.e. the establishment of an ASEAN
arbitration centre as a response to the closer regional economic co-
operation that ASEAN has seen in the recent years. The challenge
therefore is to establish a centre that is acceptable not only to private
entities, but also to all the ASEAN governments, being, as we are,
concerned with dispute resolution at the three levels referred to
previously.
The Singapore International Arbitration Centre ("SIAC") was estab-
lished for the purpose of developing international arbitration in Singa-
52pore, to benefit the reputation of Singapore. As such, it would be
inappropriate for SIAC to assume the role of the ASEAN centre. Whilst
private entities may not object to referring their ASEAN-investment
dispute to SIAC, it is possible that the other ASEAN governments would
not be so sanguine in agreeing to the utilisation of the facilities of SIAC in
any inter-State dispute or to the utilisation of SIAC as a regional
arbitration centre. As it is, regional suspicion and mistrust concerning
Singapore and Singaporeans, in general prevail. As one commentator
observed, "its motives are questioned, its methods regarded with
apprehension, and its single-mindedness [in achieving economic objec-
tives] with some envious misgivings".53 Indeed, in 1992, when the
president of the Jakarta Stock Exchange signed a technical assistance
agreement with the Singapore Stock Exchange for the computerisation of
48. Art.1, para.3 provides as follows:
"The provisions of this Protocol are without prejudice to the rights of Member
States to seek recourse to other fora for the settlement of disputes involving other
Member States."
49. The Regional Centre for Arbitration at Kuala Lumpur established under the auspices
of the Asian-African Legal Consultative Committee in 1978: See Arbitration Centre at
Kuala Lumpur, (1979) 13 Journal of World Trade Law 89; Z. Yatim, "The Regional Centre
for Arbitration, Kuala Lumpur", [1978] Malayan Law Journal lxxx.
50. The Singapore International Arbitration Centre established in 1991.
51. E.g. Zurich, Geneva and Paris under the UNCITRAL or ICC Rules or London under
the Rules of the London Court of International Arbitration.
52. L. Boo, "International Arbitration Act 1994-A Model to Follow" (1994) 7 Asia
Business L. Rev. 69 at p.71; See also L. Hsu, "The Adoption of the UNCITRAL Model Law
on International Commercial Arbitration in Singapore" [1994] Singapore Journal of Legal
Studies 387.
53. H. H. Indorf, Impediments to Regionalism in Southeast Asia-Bilateral Constraints
Among ASEAN Member States (1994) p. 3 5 .
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the former, he expressed concern that Singapore harboured hidden
motives in this show of assistance. Because the Singapore stock market
authorities have expressed an interest in the possibility of cross-listings of
shares on the stock exchanges, the Indonesians were apparently worried
that Singapore was seeking to put a compatible system in place in
Indonesia and that this would mean a diversion of business to Singapore. 4
Certainly any suggestion that SIAC should be used as the ASEAN
regional arbitration centre should not come from Singapore.
It may be argued that the Kuala Lumpur Centre may prove less
objectionable, given that it is established under the auspices of the
Asian-African Legal Consultative Committee, in which Committee all
the ASEAN countries, with the exception of Brunei, are members." The
Malaysian Government gave the assurance that it would respect the
independent functioning of the centre an as international arbitration
centre. 6 Nevertheless, the other ASEAN States may still perceive the
Centre as being predominantly Malaysian as the Government of Malay-
sia provides not only premises and personnel but also contributes towards
the operating costs of the Centre. 7 In addition, the Kuala Lumpur Centre
was set up with wider purposes in mind. It was established with the
objectives of, inter alia, serving the Asian-African and Pacific region and
promoting international commercial arbitration in this region. 8 The
ASEAN Arbitration Centre, in contrast, should be seen as one of the
proposed initial steps towards closer legal co-operation within ASEAN,
set up by ASEAN for ASEAN with a view to complementing and
enhancing intra-ASEAN economic co-operation.
The International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes
(ICSID) established by the Convention on the Settlement of Investment
Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States in 1965'9 does
provide a system for the settlement of disputes which takes into account
the interests of both foreign investors and host States.6' However, in the
context of what ASEAN's legal response ought to be in light of the
expanding intra-ASEAN economic co-operation, ICSID's jurisdiction,
54. A. Schwarz, "Bigger is Better-ASEAN Looks to Expand its Global Clout" (28 Jul.
1994), Far Eastern Economic Review 24.
55. P. G. Lim, Kuala Lumpur Regional Centre for Arbitration (1991), App.1.
56. Mahathir Mohamad, then Deputy Prime Minister of Malaysia, Address at the First
Conference on International Commercial Arbitration for the Asian and Pacific Region in
Kuala Lumpur, Jul. 1979.
57. P. G. Lim, Kuala Lumpur Regional Centre for Arbitration (1991) p.3.
58. Ibid., pp.1 and 4.
59. See A. Giardina, "The International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes
Between States and Nationals of Other States", in P. Sarcevic (Ed.), Essays on International
Commercial Arbitration (1989) 214, at p.215; G. R. Delaume, "ICSID Arbitration" in J. D.
M. Lew (Ed.), Contemporary Problems in International Arbitration (1987) 23.
60. For a detailed discussion of the workings of ICSID, see M. Hirsch, The Arbitration
Mechanism of the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (1993).
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being confined to private-governmental investment disputes may be too
narrow. The jurisdiction of an ASEAN arbitration centre would not be so
limited. In addition, not all of the ASEAN countries are at present party
to the Convention.6' Brunei is not a signatory and although Thailand has
been a signatory since 1985,62 it has yet to deposit the instrument of
ratification which would make Thailand a contracting party to the
Convention. The jurisdiction of the Centre may also be limited by a
contracting State notifying ICSID of the class or classes of disputes that it
would not consider arbitration under ICSID.63 Although none of the
ASEAN states that are contracting parties to the Convention has
restricted the application of the Convention, this does not preclude
restriction at a future date.
The advantage of an ASEAN-based arbitration centre over other
Western arbitration centres would be the provision of cheaper and faster
handling of ASEAN disputes, being closer as it would be to the nexus of
the dispute. Resort to Western arbitration centres can involve inordinate
time and expense, particulars from the point of view of ASEAN
nationals.
A. Advantages of an ASEAN Regional Centre
There are other arguments in favour of the establishment of a regional
arbitration centre.
1. Local expertise
Such a body would have the advantage of being composed of members
who are appointed specifically because of their "insider expertise", who
are attuned to ASEAN legal traditions' and policies. This is particularly
important if arbitration at the ASEAN centre is to be effective in the
resolution of inter-state or state-private disputes. One of the reason that
States may be reluctant to engage in arbitration is:
the unwillingness of governments, self-conscious of their role of guardians
of their peoples' interests and convinced of their "sovereign equality", to
leave decisions which would affect their policies to third parties who might
not comprehend or give due weight to relevant aspects of their case, or even
worse, deliberately ignore them. 5
61. For a list of the contracting States and other signatories of the Convention (as of 30
Jun. 1997), see International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, ICSID 1997
Annual Report, Annex 1.
62. Ibid.
63. Art.25 of the Convention.
64. R. H. Folsom, "ASEAN as A Regional Economic Group-A Comparative Lawyer's
Perspective" (1983) 25 Malayan Law Review 211 at p.2 2 0 .
65. M. C. W. Pinto, "The Prospects for International Arbitration: Inter-State Disputes",
in A. H. A. Soons (Ed.), International Arbitration: Past and Prospects 84 (1990).
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The ASEAN Governments must therefore have the confidence that
the arbitrators are capable of reaching a fair decision. The arbitrators at
the centre would therefore need to be aware of matters, which are of
national significance, and to take into account political dimensions. An
award that fails to accord due significance to these aspects can do
irreparable damage to the effectiveness of the decision and hence the
credibility of the centre in the eyes of the States. For disputants wishing to
appoint their own arbitrators, the ASEAN centre would be best
positioned to collect and organise appropriate information about poten-
tial arbitrators with the requisite experience, expertise and qualifications
and make this information available to the disputants.
2. Specifically tailored rules
Further, the rules of the regional arbitration centre could be formu-
lated to deal with some of the existing shortcomings of arbitration in
general.
The rules of the regional arbitration centre should require that the
arbitrators give reasons for their awards and that the awards be published
and made generally accessible. Currently, under the arbitration laws of
many countries and also under some international arbitration rules,
arbitrators are not required to give any reasons for their awards. Under
the Singapore Arbitration Act,66 for example, the arbitrator is required to
give reasons for his/her award only if, prior to the award being made, one
of the parties gave notice that a reasoned award was required. Article
32(3) of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules (adopted by the Kuala.
Lumpur Arbitration Centre) and Article 31 of the UNCITRAL Model
Law on International Commercial Arbitration (adopted by SIAC
Arbitration) provide for the statement of reasons for arbitral awards but
allows the parties the option of waiving the requirement. Most arbitral
awards are also not published without the consent of all the parties,
which, according to one commentator, is rarely given.67 This is probably
due to the perception that parties prefer to submit their disputes to
arbitration because of the privacy and confidentiality of the arbitration
proceedings.
There is however, much to be said in favour of publishing arbitral
awards. The giving of reasoned awards and the publication of these
awards would facilitate reference to useful precedents and allow some
consistency in the outcome of arbitration vis-d-vis similar issues. This
should ultimately contribute towards the development of an ASEAN
arbitral case law. The existence of a coherent body of rules would mean
66. S.28.
67. P. K. Irani, "International Commercial Dispute Resolution through Arbitration-I"
(1993) 1 Asia Business L. Rev. 29, at p.10.
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easier identification of the relevant commercial rules applicable for the
different aspects of ASEAN trade. 8
Publication of arbitral awards may also help in the negotiating process
between the parties. Reference to past arbitral decisions, from which the
likely outcome of the submission of a dispute to arbitration can be
deduced, would be of much practical use to the disputants in their
decision whether or not to proceed with the arbitration. With this
knowledge, the chances for reconciliation may actually be enhanced.
The publication of awards will also ensure that the expertise of the
arbitrators is easily appreciated.
Experience and ability are most suitably determined from the past record of
the individual. In the case of an arbitrator, this can only be done by a review
of awards in which the individual was one of or the sole arbitrator. Just as
the reputation of a judge depends, in large part, on the judgments he gives
..., so too the reputation of an arbitrator should depend on the awards he
has made.69
The knowledge that the arbitrators of the ASEAN centre have the
requisite skills would ensure confidence in and hence enhance the
standing of the centre in the eyes of ASEAN States, nationals and
foreigners alike.
The argument that privacy and confidentiality of the arbitration
proceedings is fundamental to arbitration is often cited as a reason against
the publication of arbitral awards.7" The logic of this argument was
strongly refuted by Dr J. D. M. Lew7 who counter-argues that absolute
secrecy can never be ensured. Indeed, it would seem that arbitration
institutions are realising that public interest in the publication of awards
transcends the alleged eagerness of disputants in keeping the awards
confidential. The ICC Court of Arbitration has been publishing abbrevi-
ated versions of awards rendered under its auspices.72 In addition, the
issue of the publication of awards was deliberately not dealt with under
the UNCITRAL Rules or Model Law as the proposal that publication
could be allowed only with the express consent of the parties was
rejected.73 It is undeniable that there may be situations where it remains
important that the confidentiality of the arbitration proceedings be
maintained. Such situations could arise where the proceedings involve the
68. J. D. M. Lew, "The Case for the Publication of Arbitration Awards", in J. C. Schultz&




72. H. Smit, "The Future of International Commercial Arbitration: A Single Transna-
tional Institution?" (1986) 25 Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 9, at p.18.
73. F. Knoepfler & P. Schweizer, "Making of Awards and Termination of Proceedings",
in P. Sarcevic (Ed.), Essays on International Commercial Arbitration (1989) 167.
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disclosure of highly sensitive trade secrets or details of state-of-the-art
technologies. In such circumstances, there seems no cogent reason why
the publication of the award should not omit these confidential details.
3. Enforceability
In addition to the aforesaid, enforceability of awards by the regional
centre would be facilitated by the 1958 New York Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards. All member
states of ASEAN, with the exception of Brunei,74 have ratified the New
York Convention.75 If Brunei can be persuaded to ratify the New York
Convention, there would then be no need for a separate convention
between the ASEAN States to deal with the enforceability of ASEAN
arbitral awards rendered by the centre. •
B. Some Procedural Aspects of the Arbitration Mechanism at the
Proposed ASEAN Arbitration Centre
It is not proposed to lay down in this paper a detailed proposal as to the
rules of the ASEAN arbitration centre or its arbitration mechanism.
However, the following matters are some aspects that deserve mention.
1. "Jurisdiction" of the centre
As the setting up of the centre is proposed as a response to the
expanding economic co-operation within ASEAN and as a mechanism to
deal with ASEAN disputes, the limits within which the rules of the centre
would apply and its facilities available for conciliation and arbitration
proceedings should therefore be imposed with these purposes in mind.
Hence, arbitration at the centre would be open to disputing parties who
agree to submit their dispute to the centre and whose dispute is either: (1)
a legal dispute arising out of an investment in one or more of the ASEAN
States; or (2) a legal dispute arising as between or among ASEAN States
or State entities vis-dt-vis any economic co-operative venture. It seems
particularly important, for the success of the centre, to confine the
jurisdiction of the centre vis-d-vis inter-state disputes to economic
disputes arising out of ASEAN economic arrangements that are already
in existence. This is because these economic co-operative initiatives
would already be founded on extensive consultations amongst the States
74. Supra n.61. See also P. K. Irani, "International Commercial Dispute Resolution
Through Arbitration" (1994) 3 Asia Business L. Rev. 38, at p.47.
75. There is some doubt as to the effectiveness of the 1958 New York Convention in
Thailand. The Thai military government that promulgated the domestic legislation to give
effect to the Convention had apparently acted without a parliament and there may be some
issue as to the legality of the relevant decree: J. P. Raissi, "Arbitrating in Thailand" (1992) 16
Hastings International and Comparative Law Review 99, at p.116.
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and consensus. The submission of such disputes to adjudication by a third
party should therefore be acceptable to the States. In contrast, regional
security issues, including overlapping territorial claims and disputes over
fishing and other resources are highly sensitive and contentious matters
best left to diplomatic channels for settlement. The newly formed
ASEAN Regional Forum, established specifically to provide the institu-
tional framework for the discussion of regional security issues, would be
the clearly more appropriate venue for the harmonious discussion of
these issues than at a regional arbitration centre.
Like ICSID arbitration,76 arbitration at the centre should also be
compulsory, in the sense that once both parties have consented to
arbitration at the centre, neither party may unilaterally withdraw its
consent. The rules of the centre should provide for the proceedings to
continue and to lead to an eventual award even if one party should default
or refuse to co-operate. The recognition of the award should be assured in
all ASEAN States.77 This would give to parties who agree to submit their
disputes to arbitration at the centre, particularly the private party in an
investor-State relationship, assurance that once agreement to arbitrate is
procured, they need not worry further of the risk of withdrawal.
2. Panel of arbitrators and appointment
The centre should maintain a panel of arbitrators consisting of persons
with recognised competence in investment and legal matters, and who are
attuned to ASEAN legal traditions and policies. These arbitrators may or
may not be ASEAN nationals as long as they have the requisite
competence and are able to exercise impartial and independent
judgment.
The disputing parties should remain free to choose, by consensus,
whom they wish to be the arbitrators and the number of arbitrators to
form the tribunal before whom the dispute is to be heard, subject only to
the qualification that the arbitrators appointed must meet the com-
petence criteria set by the centre.
3. Finality of award
78
As the venue of the centre's arbitration may possibly be in any of the
ASEAN countries, depending on the parties' preference, it would be
important that the centre's rules deal with the question of judicial review
76. Art.25(1) of the ICSID Convention.
77. This would probably require amendment to local arbitration legislation.
78. See P. Sarcevic, "The Setting Aside and Enforcement of Arbitral Awards under
UNCITRAL Model Law", in P. Sarcevic (Ed.), Essays on International Commercial
Arbitration (1989) 167, at p.177 and C. M. Schmitthoff, "Finality of Arbitral Awards and
Judicial Review" in J. D. M. Lew (Ed.), Contemporary Problems in InternationalArbitration
(1987) 230.
[VOL. 49
APRIL 2000] Enhancing Economic Co-operation
of the centre's arbitral awards. The arbitration laws of the country in
which the award was made would affect the issue of the finality of the
award.79
Some jurisdictions, e.g. Malaysia, allow every arbitral award to be
subjected to judicial review for both errors of fact and of law. A right of
appeal to the courts on questions of law was allowed in Singapore until
recently. With the enactment of the International Arbitration Act 1994,
such appeals against the international arbitral award to the Singapore
courts are now abolished.8" The Thai Arbitration Act of 1987 also confers
on Thai courts wide latitude to review arbitral awards.8'
That the awards of the regional arbitration centre should be subject to
the scrutiny of national courts would patently undermine the desired
effect of ASEAN documents, particularly in inter-state disputes. A way
out of this is to adopt the approach taken under the General Treaty on
Central American Economic Integration 2 which established the Central
American Common Market.83 Under Article 26 of this Treaty, the
signatory States agree to settle amicably any differences which may arise
regarding the interpretation or application of any treaty provisions.
Should the parties fail to reach agreement, the matter may be submitted
to an arbitration tribunal composed of magistrates from the Supreme
Courts of each of the contracting States. The awards of the tribunal are to
have res judicata effect for all contracting States so far as the awards
contain any ruling concerning the interpretation or application of the
provisions of the Treaty.8"
79. It should be pointed out that, whilst it is generally accepted as a principle of the 1958
New York Convention that the enforcing court may not review the merits of the arbitral
award: A. J. Van den Berg, The New York Arbitration Convention of 1958 (1981), p.269, the
Convention would not apply if the venue of the arbitration proceedings is in the country in
which recognition and enforcement of the award is also sought. This is because the
application of the NY Convention is limited to the recognition and enforcement of foreign
awards and hence would not apply in the country in which, or under the laws of which, the
award was made.
80. See Boo, op. cit., supra n.52 for a consideration of the limited circumstances in which
the court has jurisdiction to set aside an arbitral award.
81. S.24 provides that a court may deny enforcement of an arbitral award in cases "where
the court is of the opinion that an award is contrary to the law governing the dispute, is the
result of any unjustified act or procedure or is outside the scope of the binding arbitration
agreement or relief sought by the party....
82. 2 B.D.I.E.L. (CCH) 529 (13 Dec. 1960); The Treaty was originally by Guatemala,
Honduras, El Salvador and Nicaragua. Costa Rica adhered to the Treaty in 1963 but
Honduras dropped out in 1969.
83. Unfortunately, the Central American Common Market essentially collapsed near the
end of the 1970s due to revolution, war and other political problems, as well as economic
imbalances and disruptions. However, renewed efforts at economic integration were taken
by the Central American nations in 1990, although progress on this front has been rather
slow: see K. W. Abbot & G. W. Bowman, "Economic Integration in the Americas: A Work
in Progress" (1994) 14 Northwestern Journal of International Law and Business 493, at
p.5 04 .
84. Art.26; see also FOLSOM, supra n.37, at p.219.
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For private party-State or purely private situations, Article 53 of the
ICSID Convention provides a suitable model for the ASEAN centre. It
states that awards are binding and exclusive of any other remedy, except
those that are provided for under the Convention. There is therefore no
possibility for the judicial review by a national court of an ICSID award.
The only recourse available to a disgruntled disputant would be an
internal challenge within ICSID itself." Similarly, the ASEAN centre's
awards should not be subject to judicial review by national courts.
Relevant amendments to national arbitration legislation may be
necessary.
However, because arbitration is essentially a contractual system of
dispute resolution, 6 there should perhaps be provision for the parties
themselves to agree to judicial review if they so desire.87
C. Shortcomings of Arbitration
Notwithstanding the advantages of having a regional arbitration centre
discussed above, there are nevertheless weaknesses and limitations to
having only an arbitration body, albeit a regional one, as the sole
structured avenue for the resolution and settlement of all ASEAN
disputes.
First, submission of disputes to arbitration is essentially a voluntary and
consensual process. Unlike the jurisdiction of a court, which is compul-
sory and exclusive, 88 such that matters may be brought before the court
unilaterally,89 the arbitrator only has jurisdiction if the parties consent to
refer an existing or future dispute to arbitration. A matter can therefore
be brought before the arbitrator only within the limits of the arbitration
agreement between the parties.9" This issue of consent to arbitration may
be particularly problematic in transactions involving States or state
enterprises. However, it must be said that in ASEAN, where member
states are keen on importing foreign capital and expertise, the consent of
an ASEAN State to refer disputes to arbitration may not be all that
difficult to obtain as long as there is confidence in the arbitration centre.
Countries that want to procure investments for their economic develop-
ment know that without guarantees of this sort it may be hard to attract
the desired foreign investors.
85. C. D. Eklund, "A Primer on the Arbitration of NAFTA Chapter Eleven Investor-
State Disputes", (1994) Journal of International Arbitration 135, at p.153.
86. Schmitthoff, op. cit., supra n.78, p.230.
87. Ibid., p.237.
88. The view has been expressed that forcing compulsory jurisdiction of a supra-national
court on sovereign states is politically impractical: see Calamita, supra n.38, at p.568.
89. P. Pescator, The Law ofIntegration (1974), p.84.
90. P. K. Irani, "International Commercial Dispute Resolution Through Arbi-
tration-It" (1994) 3 Asia Business L. Rev. 38.
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Secondly, unless the ASEAN States agree to a separate convention
specifically for the recognition and enforcement of the centre's awards,
enforcement of the arbitral award is ultimately dependent on national
laws and national courts. Whilst the New York Convention is said to
afford the quickest and most efficient method of enforcing a foreign
arbitral award, 9 the Convention nevertheless requires contracting States
to enforce arbitral awards "in accordance with the rules of procedure of
the territory where the award is relied upon".92 In Indonesia, for example,
foreign arbitral awards will be recognised and enforced only if: (1) they
are rendered in a country that is bound by a bilateral or multilateral
convention on the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards; (2) the
subject-matter of the awards are limited to what Indonesian law defines as
"commercial" matters; (3) the awards are not contrary to Indonesian
public policy; and (4) an "exequatur" or Writ of Execution is obtained
from the Indonesian Supreme Court.93 The exequatur will not be given if
the award is contrary to "the fundamental principles of the Indonesian
legal system and society". 94 Philippine law, which provides that the
capacity of Philippine citizens, even when living abroad, shall be
governed by Philippine law95 (as opposed to the system of law with which
the contract is most closely connected or by the law of the party's domicile
or residence), may potentially remove the effectiveness of the New York
Convention.96 This is because the Convention allows the refusal of
recognition and enforcement where, inter alia, the parties to the
arbitration agreement were under some incapacity under the law to which
they are subjected. Parties would therefore need to be aware of the
particularities of national legislation and national courts, which may
create pitfalls in enforcement attempts. 97
The private party in a government/private enterprise transaction has
also to contend with the possibility that enforcement measures against the
host State may be blocked by the barrier of state immunity.9s In addition,
Article V paragraph 2 of the New York Convention provides that where
91. Irani, op. cit. supra n.90, at p.47.
92. Art.III.
93. See the Indonesian Supreme Court Regulation No.1 of 1990,1 Mar. 1990; S. Gautama,
"Some Legal Aspects of International Commercial Arbitration in Indonesia" (1990) 7
Journal of International Arbitration 93, at 103; A. T. Surowidjojo & L. G. Surowidjojo,
"ADR in Asia-Indonesia" (1989) 19 Asia Business L. Rev. 42, at p.44.
94. Art.4, para.2 of the Supreme Court Regulation No.1 of 1990.
95. Art.15, Philippine Civil Code.
96. Irani, op. cit., supra n.90, at p.47.
97. Ibid.
98. Issues of immunity of the State from execution proceedings are distinguished from
issues of immunity of the State from jurisdiction, which are raised during recognition and
enforcement procedures: see G. Bernini & A. J. Van den Berg, "The Enforcement of
Arbitral Awards Against a State: The Problem of Immunity From Execution", in J. D. M.
Lew (Ed.), Contemporary Problems in International Arbitration (1987) 359.
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the recognition or enforcement of the award would be contrary to the
public policy of the country in which recognition and/or enforcement is
sought, recognition and enforcement of the award may be refused.99
Hence, a private party who has to rely on the New York Convention for
the enforcement of its award against a State party may be faced with the
prospect of a hollow victory if the State invokes the public policy
exception."°° Whilst it remains possible, to exclude all recourse to a public
policy exception, if a separate recognition and enforcement convention or
agreement between ASEAN States is signed, as is the case under the 1966
Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States
and Nationals of Other States, it does not seem likely that such an option
would be acceptable to all ASEAN parties.
Thirdly, because of the ad-hoc nature of arbitration, the regional
arbitration centre's contribution towards the establishment of an
ASEAN legal order may be insignificant. In order to maintain and
accelerate ASEAN's growth as an economic community, there is a clear
need for a viable legal regime'0 ' on a regional level and for the
development of an ASEAN body of laws, a regional law. This is necessary
for the regulation of economic activities on a regional level, as between
member countries, providing for a definite course of action and pro-
cedures for the implementation of agreed economic policies. In the
absence of a supra-national legal order, national considerations are
bound to dictate the pace at which regional economic co-operation
proceeds. In addition, as intra-ASEAN trade increases, there will be a
need for an ASEAN approach to controls over trade and investment
practices at the commercial level. Currently, each country operates its
own laws with respect to monopolies, restrictive trade practices and
general contractual obligations. For the development of an ASEAN legal
regime to be achieved in the longer term, an ASEAN court of justice has
to be established. The weakness of the arbitral body lies in the fact that it
will not constitute a link at judicial level between the international
99. Art.V, para.2 provides as follows:
Recognition and enforcement of an arbitral awards having obtained the force of
res judicata, in the country where recognition and enforcement is sought may also
be refused if the competent authority in the country where recognition and
enforcement is sought finds that: (a) the subject-matter of the difference is not
capable of settlement by arbitration under the law of that country; or (b) the
recognition or enforcement of the award would be contrary to the public policy of
that country.
100. Although the view has been expressed that the framers of the Convention
contemplated a "circumscribed public policy doctrine" and hence the exception should be
narrowly construed: G. Bernini, "The Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards by National
Judiciaries: A Trial of the New York Conventions Ambit and Workability", in Schultsz &
Van den Berg (Eds), The Art of Arbitration (1982) 51, p.
5 9 .
101. G. S. Shenoy, "The Emergence of a Legal Framework for Economic Policy in
ASEAN" (1987) 29 Malayan Law Review 116, at p.129.
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community sphere and the domestic sphere." Arbitration centres and
arbitral decisions do not form part of the judicial system and therefore do
not contribute towards the law-making process.
Accordingly, the next item on the agenda for closer legal co-operation
for future ASEAN leaders to consider is therefore the possibility of
creating an ASEAN court.
The idea of an ASEAN court is not new. As long ago as 1981, there
were calls for such a court to be established. 3 Such calls were generally
considered untimely but more recently, the former Malaysian Lord
President Abdul Hamid Omar pushed for a common judicial system
which will represent a vital element towards ensuring economic develop-
ment' °4 in ASEAN.
The importance in establishing a regional court with the jurisdiction
and authority to impose judicial control over States grouped together in
integrative efforts is amply illustrated by the experience of the Andean
Group.1°5 The original drafters of the Andean Common Market Agree-
ment 6 did not include a court of justice. The omission was, according to
one commentator, due to the reluctance of the Andean nations to
surrender a measure of national sovereignty.1 7 However, after a decade
of attempting to co-operate without a court to interpret and enforce their
co-operative agreements, the Andean nations realised the need for a
common market court and established the Andean Court of Justice in
1979.1°8 This change in opinion came about as a result of difficulties
encountered by the Andean nations in decision making vis-di-vis the
Andean Common Market. Several regional economic policies were
adopted by the Andean nations" pursuant to the Cartegena Accord.
However, political shifts within the Andean nations resulted in disagree-
ments over the interpretations of and non-compliance with these regional
policies.1 In particular, Chile enacted a new national law which
102. Pescatore, op. cit., supra n.89, 78.
103. P. V. Fernandez, "Law and Culture in ASEAN: Towards New Structures for
Economic-Cultural Development", in R. P. Anand & P. V. Quisumbing (Eds), ASEAN
Identity, Development and Culture (1981) 328.
104. Reported in Business Malaysia, Sept. 1994 at p.2.
105. The original members were Colombia, Chile, Peru, Ecuador and Bolivia. Venezuela
became a member in 1973 and Chile withdrew in 1976.
106. Agreement on Andean Subregional Integration, 26 May 1969, 8 I.L.M. 910 (1969)
(the "Cartegena Accord").
107. E. B. Kenner, "The Andean Common Market Court of Justice: Its Purpose, Structure
and Future" [1978] 2 Journal of International Dispute Resolution 39, at p.43.
108. Treaty Creating the Court of Justice of the Cartegena Agreement, 28 May 1979, 18
I.L.M. 1203, Venezuela did not ratify the Treaty until four years later.
109. These included the Andean Investment Code (the Common Regime of Treatment of
Foreign Capital and of Trademarks, Patents, Licences and Royalties, adopted 31 Dec. 1970,
11 I.L.M. 126) and the Trade Liberalisation Program, Chaps.IV and V of the Cartegena
Accord: Keener, op. cit., supra n.107, pp.43-44.
110. Keener, op. cit., supra n.107, pp.43-49.
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contravened the regional policies."' It was felt that if the Andean
Common Market had instituted a court with supra-national enforcement
powers to enforce Andean legislation, non-compliance with regional
initiatives by member nations would be harder and the economic goals of
the grouping may not have been jeopardised."
12
There is therefore merit in the calls for the establishment of an ASEAN
court. However, whether ASEAN is ready or will ever be ready to take
such a monumental step is questionable. Certainly, this will have to be the
subject of further research.
III. CONCLUSION
WHILE it seems premature at the moment to concretise the idea of an
ASEAN court of justice, largely because of the prevailing abhorrence of
supra-nationalism, the importance of continuing legal development in
ASEAN must nevertheless not be undermined. If true economic
integration within ASEAN is to be achieved, harmonisation of substan-
tive ASEAN laws, particularly ASEAN commercial law would be
inevitable. The supranational court would then certainly have a role to
play in the development of the Association and in holding ASEAN
together, and as such, should not be dismissed cursorily as unworkable in
the ASEAN context. The ASEAN regional court may therefore be the
ultimate goal in ASEAN's quest for greater and deeper legal integration.
For the moment, it is proposed that ASEAN consider the establish-
ment of a regional arbitration centre. Aimed at business entities, both
individual and corporate and ASEAN States and state entities, the
regional arbitration centre and its dispute resolution mechanism cannot
be "forced down the throats" of the target groups. The working of the
arbitration system depends on the parties' prior agreement and consen-
sus. As such, the system recognises and complements the ASEAN
preference for non-confrontational, non-adversarial modes of dispute
resolution. Such a centre should not prove too bitter for ASEAN palates.
111. Comment, "Chile's Rejection of the Andean Common Market Regulation of Foreign
Investment", 16 Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 138.
112. Keener, op. cit., supra n.107, pp.44-47.
